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ABSTRACT 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUING DIVERSITY AND 
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS: A CONSTRUCT VALIDATION STUDY 
Rebekka Althouse Gordon 
Old Dominion University, 2008 
Director: Dr. Ivan K. Ash 
Two studies examined the construct validity of valuing diversity in relation to 
both explicit and implicit racial bias. In the first study, participants completed three 
measures: the Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale to measure valuing diversity; 
the Implicit Association Test to assess implicit racial bias; and the Symbolic Racism 
2000 Scale to assess explicit racial bias. Results indicated there was a significant 
relationship between the valuing diversity and implicit racial bias measures as well as 
between the valuing diversity and explicit racial bias measures. The explicit and implicit 
racial bias measures accounted for unique variance in the valuing diversity construct. 
There was not a significant relationship between explicit and implicit racial bias. The 
second study assessed how priming with counter-stereotypical exemplars affected 
responses to the same measures. Although it was expected that exposure to counter-
stereotypical exemplars would produce decrements in implicit racial bias, the 
manipulation did not directly affect responses to any of the measures. Together these 
studies clarify the fundamental nature of valuing diversity and provide further insight into 
the relationship between explicit and implicit racial attitudes. 
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"People who are aware of, and ashamed of, their prejudices are well on the 
road to eliminating them" (Allport, 1954). 
Multiculturalists focus on uniting diverse ethnic and racial groups through 
fostering appreciation for cultural differences. Valuing diversity initiatives are popular in 
the workplace due to their potential to positively impact a number of organizational-level 
outcomes including effectiveness, productivity, and profitability. Unfortunately, research 
has lagged behind practice in this domain, and psychologists have only begun to study the 
construct validity of valuing diversity. A relatively new measure from the field of social 
cognition may provide more insight into the constitution and structure of valuing diversity. 
No research to date has explored the link between implicit racial attitudes and self-
reported valuing diversity. The present research aims to clarify the fundamental nature of 
valuing diversity by exploring its relationship to both implicit and explicit racial bias. 
Although there have been increasingly high standards for tolerance over the past 
century, racial prejudice remains a significant concern for U.S. organizations. Enforced 
compliance with the Civil Rights Act has led to a dramatic decrease in overt racism 
(Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Nevertheless, there were still 27,238 
complaints alleging race-based discrimination filed under Title VII in the 2006 fiscal year 
(U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2007). Although there may be a 
This dissertation adheres to the format of the Journal of Applied Psychology. 
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reticence to openly express prejudice in our society, this statistic clearly indicates that 
discrimination is occurring on a regular basis. 
Even with increased compliance with equal opportunity laws, prejudice may 
nevertheless affect important employment decisions. Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) 
discovered that when rating ambiguously qualified job applicants, participants 
consistently rated White applicants as superior to Black applicants with identical 
qualifications. The evidence of racism's negative impact and the positive impact that 
well-managed diversity can have on organizations are both strong motivations to develop 
more powerful diversity initiatives, better measures, and clearer definitions of diversity 
constructs. 
Subtle Racism 
Diversity researchers attribute the majority of modern prejudice to subtle forms of 
racism. This subtle racism manifests itself in individuals who support the principle of 
racial equality and regard themselves as egalitarian, but simultaneously possess 
unconscious negative feelings about Blacks (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). These attitudes 
are thought to be pervasive in society, representing the racial attitudes of most well-
educated and liberal Whites (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). 
Often termed symbolic racists, these individuals do not believe in the notions at 
the core of traditional prejudice (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Instead, they exhibit a resistance 
to change in the "racial status quo" rooted in feelings of social morality. These feelings 
are based on perceptions that Blacks violate traditional American values such as 
discipline, self-reliance, and hard work (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Tarman & Sears (2005) 
define the four defining themes of symbolic racism as: 
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(1) Racial discrimination is no longer a serious obstacle to Black's 
prospects for a good life. (2) Black's continuing disadvantages are largely 
due to their unwillingness to work hard enough. As a result, (3) continuing 
demands and (4) increased advantages are unwarranted (p. 733). 
Symbolic racists are thought to act on their unconscious negative attitudes only 
when there is a plausible, non-prejudiced explanation available for the prejudiced 
behavior (McConahay, 1986). Therefore, a symbolic racist aspires to be 
nondiscriminatory, and believes oneself to be nondiscriminatory, yet under certain 
circumstances may exhibit discriminatory behavior. 
Minority group members are often very sensitive to any negative behaviors 
displayed by majority group members that might reveal their prejudices (Vorauer & 
Kumhyr, 2001). The result is that majority group members are inadvertently having a 
negative effect on minority group members (Holvino, Ferdman, & Merrill-Sands, 2004). 
Subtle racism is pervasive and contributes to the restriction of opportunities for Blacks 
and other minorities (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). 
Multiculturalism 
Developing appropriate and effective means to combat prejudice is an important 
goal for organizational psychologists. Traditionally, diversity initiatives emphasized a 
color-blind perspective where participants learned that race does not matter and should 
not be discussed. However, research indicates that individuals who hold color-blind racial 
attitudes are often more likely to hold racial and gender prejudices (Nelville, Roderick, 
Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000). One alternative to color-blind diversity initiatives are 
multicultural diversity programs. Multiculturalism proposes that group differences should 
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not only be acknowledged, but emphasized and celebrated (Takaki, 1993). Holvino et al. 
(2004) describe organizations that champion multiculturalism: 
In the multicultural or inclusive and diverse stage - an ideal stage in the 
development process - organizations seek and value all differences and develop 
the systems and work practices that support members of every group to succeed 
and fully contribute. Inclusion in multicultural organizations means that there is 
equality, justice, and full participation at both the group and individual levels, so 
that members of different groups not only have equal access to opportunities, 
decision-making, and positions of power, but also are actively sought out because 
of their differences (p. 248). 
In addition to these theoretical differences, there are compelling motives to design 
interventions with multiculturalism in mind. Interventions that stress appreciation for 
differences have generally been more successful than traditional diversity training 
(Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Wolkso, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Specifically, 
initiatives that are based on multiculturalism are believed to have a more positive impact 
on implicit racial bias than color-blind initiatives (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). 
Valuing Diversity 
Individuals differ in their beliefs and attitudes toward diversity (Hostager & 
DeMeuse, 2002). Valuing diversity refers to an individual's collection of attitudes and 
behavioral tendencies toward those with different cultural or ethnic backgrounds. Valuing 
diversity is the central tenet of multicultural initiatives and presumed to be the 
mechanism of change. An individual high in valuing diversity is more likely to recognize 
and accept both the similarities and differences of other people and be open to different 
races, cultures, and ethnic backgrounds (Althouse & Dickinson, 2007). It is widely 
believed that individuals, groups, and organizations must value diversity in order to reap 
the many benefits of diversity (Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007). 
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Diversity programs that are designed to increase knowledge and acceptance of 
cultural differences are often called valuing diversity programs (Gottfredson, 1992). 
Usually these programs are based around seminars and small group activities. 
Unfortunately, they are seldom evaluated for their effectiveness. As McCauley, Wright, 
and Harris (2000) indicate, 81% of the universities in their sample employed diversity 
workshops but none actually evaluated the effect of the training programs. One way to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these workshops is to measure valuing diversity. 
Measuring Valuing Diversity 
One of the best measures of valuing diversity is the Miville-Guzman Universality-
Diversity Scale (M-GUDS; Miville et al., 1999); which was developed to assess self-
reported universal-diverse orientation in a counseling psychology setting. Miville et al. 
(1999) define universal-diverse orientation as "an attitude toward all other persons that is 
inclusive yet differentiating in that similarities and differences are both recognized and 
accepted; the shared experience of being human results in a sense of connectedness with 
people and is associated with a plurality or diversity of interactions with others" (p. 292). 
Although there has not been extensive research on the valuing diversity construct, proper 
convergent and discriminant validity have been established for the M-GUDS. The 
following section summarizes validity evidence from recent research. 
Althouse and Dickinson (2007) investigated the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the M-GUDS. They found strong, significant correlations between the M-
GUDS, the Attitudes Toward Diversity Scale (ATDS; Montei, Adams, & Eggers, 1996), 
and the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy (SEE; Wang et al., 2003). A second-order factor 
model of valuing diversity offered by Althouse and Dickinson (2007) suggests that the 
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SEE and M-GUDS can be considered alternate measures of valuing diversity, but the 
ATDS measures something related but different. Althouse and Dickinson (2007) also 
found evidence for the discriminant validity of the M-GUDS. A very weak correlation 
was found between the M-GUDS and the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (Weiss, 
Dawis, England, & Lofquist, 1967) as well as between the M-GUDS and the Leader-
Member Exchange scale (Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982). 
Miville et al. (1999) reported additional construct validity evidence. The 
researchers found a strong positive correlation between the M-GUDS and the Autonomy 
subscale of the White Racial Identity Attitude Scale in an all-White sample (Helms, 
1990). In addition, Miville et al. (1999) found no significant correlation between the M-
GUDS and self-reported SAT Verbal scores and a very weak correlation between the M-
GUDS and SAT Quantitative scores. Miville et al. (1999) also found that the M-GUDS 
had a significant negative correlation with both the Homophobia Scale (Hansen, 1982) 
and the Dogmatism Scale (Troldahl & Powell, 1965). 
Research also supports that the M-GUDS is free from social desirability bias. 
Miville et al. (1999) found no significant relationship between the M-GUDS and the 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) in racially heterogeneous samples; 
supporting the discriminant validity of the M-GUDS. Similarly, Althouse and Dickinson 
(2007) found no significant relationship between the M-GUDS and the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1994). 
The preceding research provides empirical support that the M-GUDS is reliable 
and valid across different samples. The M-GUDS measures a social attitude (i.e., 
universal-diverse orientation) allied with healthy self-perceptions and empathy for others, 
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low prejudicial attitudes, and positive racial identity. Given the foregoing evidence, the 
M-GUDS can be considered a useful measure for studying the valuing of diversity in 
organizations. However, more research needs to be conducted that can further elaborate 
on the valuing diversity construct. There is a need to develop a nomological net of 
relationships around valuing diversity to clarify and identify the construct (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). There is a growing understanding of valuing diversity but there are many 
questions left to be answered. One of the best ways to expand this understanding is to 
investigate how valuing diversity measures are similar to or different from other diversity 
measures. No research to date has examined the relationship between valuing diversity 
measures and implicit measures of racial attitudes. Implicit attitude measures represent a 
paradigm shift in research about attitudes. In order to further investigate the construct 
validity of valuing diversity, the proposed study will examine its relationship with both 
implicit and explicit racial bias. 
Attitudes 
A proper investigation into the qualities of attitudes demands concrete definitions 
of all terms. Definitions of attitudes have wildly fluctuated since Airport's (1935) 
comprehensive definition: 
An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through 
experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the 
individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related 
(Allport, 1935). 
The literature is full of definitions - varying from theory to theory. Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993) argue that psychology needs a more inclusive conceptualization and they 
provide the most recent attempt at an umbrella definition. They describe an attitude as "a 
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psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some 
degree of favor or disfavor" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). In general, attitudes can be 
classified as one of two categories; explicit or implicit. 
Explicit Attitudes 
Explicit attitudes are self-reported and are believed to be almost entirely under 
conscious control (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). They reflect an evaluation 
(favorable or unfavorable) of an attitude object and signify the beliefs and intentions that 
individuals are both willing and able to report. Historically, researchers have been very 
satisfied with the considerable face validity and ease of administration that characterize 
explicit measures. However, explicit measures are thought to be biased by social 
desirability, self-deception, and social norms (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Prior to the 1980s, researchers presumed that explicit measures were the 
only way to measure attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Psychologists believed that 
all attitudes were consciously accessible and therefore endorsed. However, a paradigm 
shift in the way we conceptualize attitudes occurred when psychologists recognized that 
humans can think in ways that contradict self-reported attitudes, and that some mental 
activities might be unavailable to introspection (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The tendency 
to overestimate the thoughts and behaviors we have control over has often been referred 
to in the literature as the "illusion of conscious will" (Wegner, 2002). Presently, the field 
of psychology accepts that attitudes, goals, and stereotypes may indeed operate 
independently from conscious experience and intent (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). 
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Implicit Attitudes 
Following this paradigm shift, researchers began outlining theories of implicit 
attitudes; attitudes that exist outside awareness and conscious control (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Wilson, et al., 2000). Greenwald and Banaji (1995) defined implicit 
attitudes as "introspectively unidentified or inaccurately identified traces of past 
experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feelings toward an attitude object" (p. 
8). Implicit or automatic attitudes are considered to be important because immediate 
evaluative responses might affect behavior just as much, if not more, than introspectively 
available responses (Fazio, 1990). Researchers have developed several implicit measures 
of attitudes including: the automatic activation measure (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995); the attributional measure (von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997); 
the semantic priming task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997); and finally the most 
popular, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
Implicit attitude measurement has many advantages over explicit measurement. First of 
all, implicit measures are thought to avoid the social desirability, self-deception, and 
social norm concerns that plague explicit measures. Secondly, implicit measures are 
indirect measures, so they may reveal information individuals are either unwilling or 
unable to report (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Participants are not necessarily aware of 
what implicit measures are assessing or may be unable to control responses. Therefore, 
implicit measures are also much less susceptible to any deliberate modification (Fazio et 
al., 1995). 
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Relationship between Implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
Questions concerning the nature of the relationship between explicit and implicit 
attitudes have not been simple to answer. There are at least three distinct hypotheses 
about the relationship. Some researchers assert that the constructs are completely 
independent; some believe they tap the same underlying attitudinal construct; and others 
believe they are distinct but related constructs. Several studies demonstrate that explicit 
and implicit measures account for wholly unique variance (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 
2001), while others show evidence of significant correlations between implicit and 
explicit measures (e.g. Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001). Blair (2001) reviewed 25 studies 
and found that observed correlations between explicit and implicit attitudes were 
typically low (median .13) but occasionally substantial (maximum .60). After years of 
study, the prominent implicit attitude scholars believe that the constructs are distinct but 
related (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006; Nosek & Symth, 2007). Nosek (2005) has 
proposed that the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes may be moderated 
by self-presentation, evaluative strength, dimensionality, and distinctiveness. Structural 
analyses of implicit and explicit attitudes show they do have components in common but 
retain unique elements that cannot be attributed to the mode of measurement 
(Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
The Implicit Association Test 
The most researched and controversial implicit attitude measure is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT has generated enormous interest 
in both the scientific community and the general public. Specifically, there is a lot of 
interest around what exactly the IAT measures. Essentially, the IAT is a measure of how 
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closely associated an attitude object is with an evaluative attribute. This association is 
measured by the length of time it takes participants to categorize positive/negative words 
and sort photos representing two conceptual categories using the same response modality 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). The assumption is that responses will be facilitated (both faster 
and more accurate) when categories more closely associated by the respondent share a 
response key (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). Larger IAT effects denote 
stronger associations between the mapped concepts (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). 
Robust and easy to administer, the IAT produces widespread effects across different 
groups of people (Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2007). The IAT also has excellent 
internal consistency (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) and strong test-retest reliability (Blair, 2001; Lane et al., 
2007; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). It produces large effect sizes in comparison 
to other implicit measures (Greenwald et al., 1998) and is rather insensitive to 
methodological factors, such as the number of trials (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; 
Greenwald et al., 1998). Most importantly, the IAT meaningfully predicts a wide range of 
criterion variables including physiological responses, behaviors, and attitudes (Poehlman, 
Uhlmann, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). These effects are difficult to fake (Kim, 2003) 
and awareness of performance on an IAT while completing it will not affect scores 
(Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001). 
Some researchers have criticized the fundamental nature of the IAT. Major 
criticisms include claims that the IAT measures familiarity bias (Brendl, Markman, & 
Messner, 2001), asymmetries in perceptual salience (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), or 
cultural knowledge (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olsen & Fazio, 
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2004). Although healthy deliberations frequently appear in the literature, supporters of 
the IAT have consistently and successfully rejected these criticisms as follows. 
The most cited criticism of the IAT is that responses are confounded with 
familiarity bias. Greenwald & Nosek (2001) explain that familiarity is not a substantial 
source of artifact unless extremely unfamiliar stimuli are utilized. They recommend using 
caution when interpreting results of an IAT incorporating unfamiliar nonsense words. 
When task stimuli do not fall into an existing category, the IAT may not operate as 
desired (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). 
Rothermund and Wentura (2004) claim that IAT effects are dependent on 
perceptual salience. Specifically, they assert that salience asymmetries account for 
common variance in the IAT effect. Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and Klauer (2005) agree 
that perceptual asymmetries may influence responses on the IAT but that they are not 
stronger influences than the all-important association strengths. 
Many researchers have asserted that the IAT measures something about the 
culture as opposed to the respondent (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; 
Olsen & Fazio, 2004). As indicated previously, the IAT successfully measures individual 
differences in many criterion variables. The ability of the IAT to measure individual 
differences suggests the IAT measures something in the person as opposed to the culture 
(Poehlman et al., 2005). 
The Race IAT 
Researchers have developed IATs to measure attitudes related to age, gender, 
religion, disability, sexual orientation, and weight among many others (Nosek, Banaji, & 
Greenwald, 2002). However, the most researched is the Race IAT. This instrument is 
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designed to measure implicit racial bias against Black individuals. The Race IAT requires 
participants to categorize words and photos of people using two response keys. The 
stimulus words all have an evaluative component (e.g., can easily be classified as "good" 
or "bad"). If participants respond faster when White faces and good words are classified 
with the same response key than when Black faces and good words are classified with the 
same response key, this implies an unconscious or automatic prejudice against Blacks 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Response latencies are typically 
longer for making counter-stereotypical associations (Poehlman et al., 2005). 
Research has shown that nearly all White participants (over 90%) have an implicit 
racial bias preferring Whites to Blacks (Greenwald et al., 1998). This outcome is 
dependable and has been replicated in most subsequent IAT research. Implicit racial 
attitudes, like all implicit attitudes, are generally considered separate but related to 
explicit racial attitudes. There are weak to moderate relationships between explicit and 
implicit measures of racial attitudes (Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & Leibold, 
2001; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Poehlmann et al. (2005) found that the Race IAT 
predicted criterion behaviors significantly better than explicit measures of prejudice and 
stereotypes. 
Implicit racial bias is an attitude that remains constant across different age groups. 
Baron and Banaji (2006) found that implicit racial bias as measured by the IAT remains 
constant across 6 year olds, 10 year olds, and adults. However, explicit racial bias appears 
to decrease with increasing age, with adults typically reporting no bias. Researchers have 
also studied the brain activity of participants engaged in a Race IAT task. Phelps et al. 
(2000) found that the degree of preference for White versus Black faces was related to 
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differential activation of the amygdala. This difference in activation was significantly 
correlated with implicit racial bias as measured by the IAT. However, no similar 
relationship was found with explicit racial bias measures. Since the amygdala is often 
thought of as the emotional center of the brain, this suggests the IAT is measuring 
something affective as opposed to purely cognitive. 
Many critics have attacked the fundamental nature of the Race IAT. Chugh 
(2004) is troubled by the idea of measuring racial bias with response time. She challenges 
"how can societal justice come down to 5% of 1 second?" (Chugh, 2004, p. 208). 
Karpinski and Hilton (2001) assert that the IAT may not measure attitudes at all, but may 
only tap into different components of the environment and culture of the respondent. 
Redding (2004) argues that implicit prejudice may simply be a measure of stereotype 
knowledge and nothing else. Finally, Arkes and Tetlock (2004) assert that having a 
comparatively better attitude toward one's own race is not the same as being prejudiced 
against other races. Proponents of the IAT combat these criticisms by attributing them to 
the mistaken belief that humans can exert control over stereotypes and prejudice, when in 
reality there is no reason to believe that we can easily control these types of feelings and 
beliefs (Bargh, 1999). 
The Race IAT in Organizations 
Industrial-organizational psychologists have not yet tapped the potential of the 
Race IAT as a tool for combating the ill effects of racial prejudice in organizations. The 
fact that participants are consistently surprised by their IAT scores suggests that the Race 
IAT taps attitudes not available to conscious introspection (Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, 
Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). The IAT effect can be 
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very disconcerting for participants because the available data often contradict personal, 
presumed attitudes. Discomfort or feelings of guilt result from the awareness of "an 
evaluative disparity between conscious attitudes and unconscious evaluations and (b) a 
lack of control over one's responses on a task that has personal meaning and value" 
(Banaji, 2001, p. 136). As discussed earlier, modern conceptualizations of prejudice 
suggest that individuals may hold prejudiced attitudes that they are unwilling to express. 
However, it may actually be the case that individuals hold prejudiced attitudes they are 
unable to express (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). People with the best intentions will 
still experience great difficulty trying to avoid responses that are not accessible to 
conscious awareness (Bargh, 1997). For this reason, the Race IAT could make an 
excellent tool for self-insight into subtle racism. It could give individuals an unparalleled 
opportunity to take a look "underground" at their racial biases (Monteith et al., 2001). 
Blair (2002) indicates that "highly motivated individuals can modify the 
automatic operation of stereotypes and prejudice" when made aware of implicit biases (p. 
247). Therefore, individuals and institutions need to be aware of implicit biases and how 
they operate in order to have any hope of changing them. Although it is wildly premature 
to use the Race IAT for decisions that have any kind of direct, personal consequences for 
employees (i.e., screening, selection); the measurement of implicit racial bias does have 
its place in organizations (Nosek et al., 2006). The IAT could be administered as a 
preliminary exercise for diversity training. With proper feedback about IAT performance, 
participants could quickly and easily have a palpable experience of their own implicit 
racial biases (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001). This experience might influence 
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the effectiveness of the subsequent training by increasing individual identification with 
the training content. 
There are considerable costs to ignoring the effects of implicit racial bias in 
organizations. Reskin (2002) asserts that "micro-acts of discrimination," those taking 
place outside conscious awareness, can actually compound into macro-patterns of 
injustice with cumulative effects. Implicit attitudes may not be explicitly endorsed but are 
nevertheless important because they represent attitudes that can influence perceptions, 
judgments, and ultimately actions (Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2004). Even when 
individuals harbor unconscious biases, their resultant actions can still have powerful 
effects (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). Richeson and Shelton (2003) found that implicit 
racial bias predicts how well participants process information; predicting executive 
function better than an explicit measure. Implicit bias can also directly affect 
performance in teams. Dovidio (2001) found that the most efficient dyads on a problem-
solving task were pairs of participants with low explicit and implicit racial bias. 
Implicit racial bias, as measured by the IAT, predicts individual differences in 
judgments and behaviors as well as cognitive events. McConnell and Leibold (2001) 
found that greater implicit bias against Blacks predicted more negative nonverbal 
behaviors when communicating with a White experimenter than in identical interactions 
with a Black experimenter. These behaviors included smiling, extemporaneous 
comments, friendliness, speech errors and speech hesitation. Implicit prejudice also 
predicted lower levels of visual contact and higher rates of blinking in the responses of 
White participants to Black partners (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 
1997). Stronger implicit bias toward Blacks covaried with more negative judgments of 
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ambiguous actions by Black targets (Rudman & Lee, 2002). Finally, in a very compelling 
study, Green et al. (2007) found that doctors with stronger implicit racial bias against 
Blacks were less likely to prescribe certain medications to Black patients with identical 
conditions to White patients. 
Implicit racial bias also predicts cognitive and perceptual events. When asked to 
categorize racially ambiguous faces as Black or White, participants who were high in 
implicit racial bias tended to categorize faces with more hostile expressions as Black 
(Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). There is a growing research literature on cognitive 
performance related to prejudice. Richeson and Shelton (2003) found that participants 
with higher implicit racial bias showed significantly more cognitive decrement (as 
measured by performance on the Stroop test) after interactions with a Black confederate 
compared to those with low racial bias. Implicit racial bias also predicted greater 
activation in the amygdala when participants were presented with Black faces; suggesting 
an emotional component to automatic associations (Phelps et al., 2000). These results 
suggest that implicit bias may result in an involuntary neural response when encountering 
members of certain groups. There may be neural circuitry involved in the control of 
spontaneously activated negative attitudes (Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & 
Banaji, 2003). 
Manipulating Implicit Attitudes 
If the goal of diversity training is to change attitudes and ultimately behaviors, 
researchers must understand how attitudes can be manipulated. Initially, researchers 
believed that implicit attitudes were trait characteristics and could not be altered. 
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However, recent research suggests that automatically activated racial attitudes can be 
manipulated. 
Implicit racial attitudes can shift in relation to changes in the situation and new 
learning (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). The following summarizes the research on 
manipulating implicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes can be affected by: manipulating the 
race of the experimenter (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001); priming with positive 
exemplars (Bodenhausen, Schwartz, Bless, & Wanke, 1995); listening to misogynistic 
rap music (Rudman & Lee, 2002); engaging in counter-stereotypical mental imagery 
(Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001); manipulating relative privilege and situational power 
(Guimond, Dif, & Aupy, 2002; Dambrun & Guimond, 2004; Richeson & Ambady, 
2003); manipulating facial expressions of participants (Ito, Chiao, Devine, Lorig, & 
Cacioppo, 2006); climate for racial bias (Ziegert & Hanges, 2005); the presence of 
explicit egalitarian attitudes (Cunningham, Neslek, & Banaji, 2004); and the availability 
of cognitive resources (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). 
Of these manipulations, priming with counter-stereotypical exemplars is one of 
the strongest and most enduring influences on implicit racial attitudes. Dasgupta and 
Greenwald (2001) found that respondents who were primed with photos and descriptions 
of admired Black individuals and infamous White individuals responded with 
significantly less implicit racial bias than a control group. Explicit racial bias was not 
significantly affected by the same manipulation. Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) used 
exemplars from both racial groups because they suspected that exposure to exemplars 
from both groups is necessary to manipulate implicit attitudes. They explain that attitudes 
toward Blacks may be partially determined by attitudes toward other reference groups, 
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such as Whites (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). The counter-stereotypical primes used in 
their study produced a significant decrement in implicit racial bias that endured for at 
least 24 hours. The durability of this effect beyond 24 hours is unknown as no further 
measurements were taken. 
Purpose and Design 
The previous research highlights the malleability of implicit racial bias. To date, 
there has been no similar research on the malleability of valuing diversity attitudes. There 
are many important and unanswered research questions regarding valuing diversity, 
implicit, and explicit racial attitudes. These include: What is the relationship between 
valuing diversity, explicit racial bias, and implicit racial bias? How much of the variance 
in valuing diversity can be explained by implicit and explicit racial bias? What would 
happen to valuing diversity if we manipulate a variable known to affect implicit racial 
bias? How might these constructs be affected by counter-stereotypical priming? Would 
they be affected in similar ways? And finally: What would that tell us about the valuing 
diversity construct? 
Two studies aim to answer these questions and explore the fundamental nature of 
valuing diversity. To this end, participants in the first study completed a valuing diversity 
measure (M-GUDS), an explicit racial bias measure (Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale; 
Henry & Sears, 2002), and an implicit racial bias measure (Race IAT). Together, these 
measures provide construct validity information for the valuing diversity measure (M-
GUDS). 
The second study utilized a method previously shown to manipulate implicit 
racial bias. The researchers examined the effect of this manipulation on both valuing 
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diversity, explicit, and implicit racial bias. All participants completed the same three 
measures as in the first study. However, participants in an experimental group were 
primed with counter-stereotypical exemplars. The experimental group was primed by 
completing a task based on the procedures described in Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001). 
It was expected that implicit racial bias in the experimental group would be significantly 
lower than in the control group, but it was unknown how the manipulation might affect 
valuing diversity and explicit racial bias. Results will provide further clarification of the 
valuing diversity construct and provide insight into the ways it might be manipulated. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD STUDY ONE 
The first study investigates the nature and structure of valuing diversity by 
comparing it with both explicit and implicit racial bias. All three measures used in this 
study have been independently validated and have excellent reliability. However, no 
published studies have previously administered them in concert. The M-GUDS has not 
been validated against either an explicit or implicit measure of racial bias until now. 
Participants 
A convenience sample of 219 undergraduate students participated in the study. 
All participants were at least 18 years of age and enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses at Old Dominion University. See Table 1 for the complete racial and gender 
breakdown of the sample. The mean age of the sample was 19.99 years. 
Table 1 
Numbers of Women and Men by Racial Group in Study 1 



























































The participants received 1 psychology department research credit for their 
participation. The proposed research was reviewed within the university to ensure that all 
participants were treated in accordance with ethical guidelines endorsed by the American 
Psychological Association and the Institutional Review Board. 
Materials 
The Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale - Short Form 
Shortly after the 45-item M-GUDS (Miville et al., 1999) was introduced, Fuertes, 
Miville, Mohr, Sedlacek, and Gretchen (2000) developed a 15-item short form (M-
GUDS-S). The M-GUDS-S preserves the structure of the M-GUDS and strongly 
correlates with the long form (r = .77). Due to its more clearly delineated factor structure, 
use of the short form allows for analysis of the overall construct as well as the individual 
subscale factors. The M-GUDS-S employs a 6-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6) (Fuertes et al., 2000). Five items make up each 
subscale. Example items are as follows: Relativistic Appreciation subscale—"Knowing 
about the different experiences of other people helps me understand my own problems 
better"; Diversity of Contact subscale—"I attend events where I might get to know 
people from different racial backgrounds"; and Comfort with Differences subscale— 
"Getting to know someone of another race is generally an uncomfortable experience for 
me." Of the 15 items, only the 5 items on the Comfort with Differences subscale are 
reverse-scored. See Appendix A for a complete list of M-GUDS-S items. 
Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale 
The Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K; Henry & Sears, 2002) is an explicit 
measure of racial bias, designed to measure symbolic racism in contemporary society. 
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The SR2K is intended to improve upon and replace outdated scales such as the Modern 
Racism Scale (McConahey, 1986). The SR2K is internally consistent and has excellent 
construct, predictive, and discriminant validity (Henry & Sears, 2002). The SR2K 
includes 8 items with varying response formats. Higher scores indicate stronger symbolic 
racist attitudes. Example items include, "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities 
overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same," and "Over the 
past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve." Of the 8 items, 4 are reverse-
scored. See Appendix B for a complete list of items. 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
The IAT used in this study replicates the standard Race IAT (Greenwald et al., 
1998) and was programmed and presented using "E-Prime" experimental programming 
software (Version 1.2; Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). All of the IAT stimuli 
were created by Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002) and used with permission. The 12 
grayscale photographs include 6 Black (3 male, 3 female) and 6 White (3 male, 3 female) 
young faces cropped to show only the center portion of the face. The 12 positive and 
negative stimuli target words are listed in Appendix C. 
The IAT design consisted of two single-category classifications followed by two 
configurations of double categorizations. Category labels appeared at the upper left and 
upper right corners of the screen and respondents were asked to appropriately categorize 
the four types of stimuli that appeared in the middle of the screen using the "E" and "I" 
keys. Error feedback was provided in the form of a red "X" that appeared following any 
incorrect responses. In the event an incorrect response was made, the "X" would appear 
on the screen until the correct response is keyed. The order each stimuli appeared during 
each block of trials was always chosen randomly without replacement by the E-Pnme 
program. 
Respondents were asked to classify positive and negative words as either "Good" 
or "Bad" during the first block of 24 practice trials (See Appendix D for example 
screenshots). Respondents were asked to classify photographs of Black and White faces 
as either "Black American" or "White American" during the second block of 24 practice 
trials. 
Following these two blocks of practice trials, the remaining four blocks of trials 
consisted of double category configurations. During these trial blocks, positive words, 
negative words, photographs of Black faces, or photographs of White faces could appear 
as target stimuli. Respondents were asked to classify these stimuli as either "Black 
American" and "Bad," or "White American" and "Good". The third block of 24 trials 
was designed as a "practice" trial block while the fourth block of 48 trials was designed 
as a "critical" trial block. 
In the second combined pairing, respondents are asked to classify photographs of 
faces and target words as either "Black American" and "Good," or "White American" 
and "Bad." Again, the fifth block of 24 trials was designed as a "practice" block while the 
sixth block of 48 trials was designed as a "critical" block. 
In order to properly counterbalance the presentation of the double configurations 
within the I AT, two versions of the IAT were created. Each version corresponded to an 
order of the double configuration categories within the IAT. 
Scoring Algorithm 
IAT scores were calculated using the D scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & 
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Banaji, 2003). This procedure replaces the scoring procedures described in the original 
IAT research (Greenwald et al., 1998) with a scoring procedure more similar to Cohen's 
d, a well-known effect size measure. D is computed as the difference in average response 
latency between the two combined tasks, divided by the inclusive standard deviation of 
response latencies in the two combined tasks (Greenwald et al., 2003). Calculations of 
Cohen's J use a within treatment pooled standard deviation, whereas calculations of D 
use an inclusive pooled standard deviation. Calculations of inclusive pooled standard 
deviation include all response latencies in the two combined tasks (Greenwald et al., 
2003). The benefits of using the D scoring algorithm include: greater sensitivity to IAT 
effects; improved magnitude of correspondence between implicit and explicit measures; 
greater resistance to contamination due to response speed and general processing speed 
differences; greater resistance to effects of past IAT experience; greater resistance to 
order effects; and less contamination from extraneous variables (Greenwald et al., 2003). 
Use of the D scoring algorithm is also associated with elimination of cognitive skill 
confounds (Cai, Sriram, & Greenwald, 2004). 
Procedure 
This study was announced to participants in the Psychology Department's 
research pool. A flyer was posted in the psychology department to inform eligible 
participants of the study (See Appendix E) and the online participant recruitment system 
also provided this information. 
Participants completed all scales and tasks on a computer in an on-campus 
computer laboratory. E-Prime recorded and compiled participant responses to all three 
measures. Upon arrival, participants were asked to read and sign an informed consent 
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form. They were advised of their right to cease participation at any time and for any 
reason without penalty (see consent form, Appendix F). A copy of the welcome script the 
researchers used is found in Appendix G. Identifying information was collected only for 
the purposes of assigning research credit appropriately. In order to ensure anonymity of 
responses, this information was collected separately from the study data and could not be 
linked to it in any way. 
Following the introductory briefing and collection of the signed informed consent 
forms, the participants were randomly assigned to one of two versions of the study 
program and seated at a computer. The two versions of the program corresponded to the 
two orders of IAT double configurations. Of the 219 participants, 122 received stereotype 
congruent blocks first and 97 received the stereotype incongruent blocks first. All 
participants answered demographic questions before proceeding with the rest of the study 
(See Appendix H). E-Prime presented the three measures of interest using random 
selection without replacement. For the M-GUDS and SR2K measures, participants were 
instructed that the scales measured their opinions and that items had no right or wrong 
answers. For the IAT task, participants were instructed to classify photographs of Black 
and White faces as well as pleasant and unpleasant words as quickly as possible using the 
appropriate response keys. For complete instructions see Appendix I. 
The completion of the three measures took participants approximately 45 minutes. 
Following the completion of the measures, participants were debriefed and received a 
copy of the debriefing form (See Appendix J). They were then given the opportunity to 
ask questions. At no point during or after the experiment did participants receive any 
indication of their performance on any of the measures. 
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Statistical Power 
It was estimated that approximately 127 White participants would be necessary to 
achieve statistical power of .80. This was calculated based on prior research on the 
relationship between explicit and implicit racial bias measures. In the Blair (2001) meta-
analysis, the average correlation between explicit and implicit attitudes was significant 
but low (median .13). This effect size was used to calculate a conservative estimated 
sample size for this study. In order to reliably detect a medium-sized correlation, as 
defined by Cohen (1988), with .80 power and alpha set at .05, a minimum sample size of 
127 would be required. The researchers were able to secure exactly 127 White 
participants. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS STUDY ONE 
Data Preparation 
The following procedures described in Greenwald et al. (2003) were used to 
calculate D scores for each participant. Practice trials from blocks 3 and 5 were included 
as useful data per the algorithm procedures. Two participants were excluded from the 
database due to an overabundance of anticipatory responses (more than 10% of response 
trials with less than 300 msec response latencies). Next, individual trial responses less 
than 300 msec and greater than 10,000 msec were deleted from the database. Trial 
responses less than 300 msec indicate anticipatory responses and responses greater than 
10,000 msec indicate inattention. Incorrect trial responses were penalized by replacing 
response latencies with individual block means plus a penalty of 500 msec. After 
recalculating block means to include the penalty response trials, inclusive pooled 
standard deviations were calculated for all of the trials in blocks 4 and 6 together (critical 
blocks), as well as blocks 3 and 5 together (practice blocks). Difference scores were 
calculated by subtracting the stereotype congruent block mean from the stereotype 
incongruent block mean (MBiock6-MBiOCk4 and MBIOCICS - Msi0ck3)- This provided two 
difference scores. Each difference score was then divided by its associated inclusive 
standard deviation. The D score for each participant was the equal weight average of the 
resulting ratios. 
Reliability of Measures 
While internal consistency reliability estimates of IAT measures are often 
reported in studies, details of how researchers arrive at these calculations are seldom 
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provided. In this research, difference scores were calculated for each of the 24 unique 
stimuli that appeared during the Race IAT. These scores represented the difference 
between response latencies for each stimulus during stereotype congruent and 
incongruent blocks. For trial blocks during which individual stimuli appeared more than 
once, average response latencies across block appearances were used in the calculation of 
difference scores. When calculating coefficient alpha, each difference score was treated 
as an individual item. 
All three measures demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability. The 
coefficient alphas for the IAT were high for critical trials (a = .86) and practice trials (a = 
.73). The coefficient alpha for the combination of the IAT practice and critical trials (a = 
.81) also indicated adequate internal consistency. The coefficient alphas for the M-
GUDS-S (a = .76) and its subscales were acceptable: Relativistic Appreciation subscale 
(a = .59); Diversity of Contact subscale (a = .75); and Comfort with Differences subscale 
(a = .72). Finally, the coefficient alpha for the SR2K (a = .78) indicated adequate internal 
consistency reliability. 
Differences in Responses across Demographic Groups 
There were significant differences in responses to the three measures by race of 
participant. There were significant mean differences in implicit racial bias as measured 
by the IAT, F (5, 213) = lA6,p< .01, n2 = .18. White participants responded with 
significantly more implicit racial bias than either Black or Hispanic participants (See 
Table 2). Asian participants responded with significantly more implicit racial bias than 
Black participants. There were also differences in the percentage of participants in each 
racial category with implicit bias against Blacks, indicated by a D score greater than zero 
(See Table 2). These percentages are on par with those reported in previous research. 
There were significant mean differences in explicit racial bias across races as 
measured by the SR2K, F (5,213) = 14.86,/? < .01, n2 = .35. White participants 
responded with significantly more explicit racial bias than either Black or Other 
participants (See Table 2). Asian participants responded with significantly more implicit 
racial bias than Black participants. There were no significant differences in responses to 
the M-GUDS-S or its subscales across races. 
There were no significant mean differences between men and women on any of 
the measures. There were also no significant interaction effects for the combination of 
race and gender on any of the measures. The Race IAT error rates were on par with those 
reported in previous research (See Table 2). 
Previous research on implicit racial bias has concentrated on the bias of Whites 
against Blacks. Since the present research is building upon this research, the following 
analyses were performed only on the portion of the sample that selected the 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Relationship between Measures 
There were significant correlations between the valuing diversity measure and 
both the explicit and implicit racial bias measures (See Table 3). The M-GUDS-S 
significantly correlated with both the I AT and the SR2K. All of the M-GUDS-S subscales 
significantly correlated with the IAT and SR2K. However, there was no significant 
correlation found between the IAT and the SR2K. When corrected for unreliability in the 
measures using the Spearman correction for attenuation formula, the correlation between 
valuing diversity and implicit racial bias was estimated at -.34, the correlation between 
valuing diversity and explicit racial bias was estimated at .-49, and the correlation 
between explicit and implicit racial bias was estimated at .14. 
Table 3 
Correlations between the Racial Attitude Measures in Study 1 






.11 -- .78 
Note. N = 127. *Significant atp < .05. **Significant at/? < .01. M-GUDS-S = Miville-
Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale Short Form; M-GUDS RA = M-GUDS Relativistic 
Appreciation subscale; M-GUDS DC = M-GUDS Diversity of Contact; M-GUDS CD = 
M-GUDS Comfort with Differences; SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale; and Race 
IAT = Race Implicit Association Test. 
1. M-GUDS-S 
2. M-GUDS-S RA 
3. M-GUDS-S DC 
4. M-GUDS-S CD 


































The combination of explicit and implicit racial bias significantly predicted valuing 
diversity, F(2,124) = 15.35,/? < .001, R2 = .20 (See Table 4). Explicit racial bias was the 
best predictor of valuing diversity and accounted for 14% of the variance in valuing 
diversity. Implicit racial bias accounted for a significant 6% of the variance. See Figure 1 
for a diagram depicting the unique variance that each predictor explains in the valuing 
diversity construct. 
Table 4 
Regression Analysis Summary for Racial Bias Variables Predicting Valuing Diversity 
Variable 
Implicit Racial Bias 

















Note. N = 127. **Significant at/? < .01. SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale and Race 







Figure 1. Unique variance in the Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale 
Short Form (M-GUDS-S) accounted for by the Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale 
(SR2K) and the Race Implicit Association Test (Race IAT) in the Study 1 sample. 
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Summary of Results 
The results of the first study revealed the nature of the relationship between the 
valuing diversity, implicit racial bias, and explicit racial bias measures. There was a 
significant negative relationship between the valuing diversity and implicit racial bias 
measures and also between the valuing diversity and explicit racial bias measure. There 
was no significant relationship between the explicit racial bias and implicit racial bias 




METHOD STUDY TWO 
The second study investigated whether repeated exposure to counter-stereotypical 
exemplars could produce decrements in measurements of valuing diversity, explicit racial 
bias, and implicit racial bias. The methodology replicates the manipulation from 
Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001). They found that exposure to photos of admired Black 
and disliked White individuals produced significant decrements in implicit racial bias but 
did not affect explicit racial bias. The current study tested the same manipulation's effect 
on valuing diversity in addition to implicit and explicit racial bias. 
Participants 
A convenience sample of 196 undergraduate students participated in the study. 
All participants were at least 18 years of age and enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses at Old Dominion University. See Table 3 for the complete racial and gender 
breakdown of this sample. The mean age of this sample was 20.6 years. 
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Table 5 
Numbers of Women and Men by Racial Group in Study 2 


























































The participants received 1 psychology department research credit for their participation. 
The proposed research was reviewed within the university to ensure that all participants 
were treated in accordance with ethical guidelines endorsed by the American 
Psychological Association and the Institutional Review Board. 
Materials 
All participants completed the M-GUDS-S, SR2K, and Race IAT. See Study 1 for 
specific detail about these measures. 
Counter Stereotypical Exemplars 
The experimental task required the collection of 20 exemplars. These exemplars 
included photographs and descriptions of 10 admired Black (e.g., Tiger Woods) and 10 
notorious White (e.g., Charles Manson) individuals. Exemplars were based on the 
counter-stereotypical exemplars used in the Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) study. Some 
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dated exemplars were replaced with more current exemplars. Dasgupta and Greenwald 
(2001) used only male exemplars in their study because they were unable to produce a 
sufficient number of famous disliked Black women for their second experimental 
condition. Since that experimental condition was not being duplicated in this research, 
both genders were represented in the exemplars. All photos were converted into a 
standard format of 150 X 200 pixels and 256-color grayscale. Both true and false 
descriptions were generated for each exemplar. All false descriptions matched true 
descriptions in valence. See Appendix K for a complete list of exemplars and 
descriptions. 
Control Group Exemplars 
Photographs of 10 flowers (e.g., orchid) and 10 insects (e.g., mosquito) were 
collected for use in the control task. Again, these exemplars were generated based on the 
control exemplars used in Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001). All photos were converted 
into a standard format of 150 X 200 pixels and 256-color grayscale. Both true and false 
names were generated for each photograph. See Appendix L for a complete list of 
flowers and insects. 
Procedure 
The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1 with the addition of the 
experimental and control priming tasks that participants were asked to complete prior to 
the administration of the three target measures. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the control or experimental groups. Of the 196 participants, 88 were randomly 
assigned to the control group, and 108 to the experimental group. The procedures for both 
the experimental and control tasks were identical to procedures outlined by Dasgupta and 
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Greenwald (2001). Of the 196 participants, 98 received stereotype congruent IAT blocks 
first and 98 received the stereotype incongruent IAT blocks first. 
Experimental Priming Task 
The experimental task was presented to participants as a test designed to assess 
general knowledge about famous and infamous individuals. See Appendix L for complete 
instructions. Each photograph appeared in the center of the screen along with the name of 
the individual in the photograph. In the upper left and right corners of the screen, both a 
correct and an incorrect description appeared. For example, a photograph of Martin 
Luther King appeared along with a correct description, "Leader of the Black Civil Rights 
movement in the 1960s," as well as an incorrect description, "Former Vice President of 
the United States" (See Appendix M for example screenshots). 
Participants were asked to identify the correct description by pressing the "E" key 
to select the description on the left and the "I" key to select the description on the right. If 
a participant selected an incorrect description, a red "X" appeared on the screen. The "X" 
remained visible until the correct response was made (See Appendix N for complete 
instructions). 
During the first block of trials, each target photograph was randomly presented 
twice for a total of 40 trials. E-Prime randomly selected the order of stimuli presentation. 
Half of the correct and incorrect descriptions appeared on each side of the screen. 
During the second block of trials, only the exemplar names appeared in the center 
of the screen. Participants were asked to classify the race of the name as either "Black" or 
"White". Each name appeared twice for a total of 40 trials. Again, E-Prime randomly 
selected the order of presentation. For approximately half of the participants, the "E" key 
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(N = 49) was used to classify Black exemplars and "I" for White exemplars; and for the 
rest of the participants (N= 60) "E" was used to classify White exemplars and "I" for 
Black exemplars. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these category 
configurations. 
Control Task 
The control task instructions described the task as a test designed to assess general 
knowledge about flowers and insects. See Appendix N for complete instructions. E-Prime 
randomly selected target photographs to appear in the center of the screen. Each 
photograph appeared without a name. In the upper left and right corners of the screen, 
both a correct and an incorrect name appeared. For example, a photograph of an orchid 
appeared along with a correct name, "Orchid" as well as an incorrect name, "Hydrangea" 
(See Appendix O for example screenshots). 
Participants were instructed to identify the appropriate name by pressing the "E" 
key to select the name on the left and the "I" key to select the name on the right. When a 
participant selected an incorrect name, a red "X" appeared on the screen. The "X" 
remained visible until the correct response was made. 
During the first block of trials, each target photograph appeared twice for a total 
of 40 trials. E-Prime randomly selected the order of presentation for the photographs. 
Half of the correct and incorrect names appeared on each side of the screen. 
During the second block of trials, only the names of the flowers and insects 
appeared in the center of the screen. Participants were asked to classify the exemplars as 
either "flowers" or "insects" (See Figure 6). Each name appeared twice for a total of 40 
trials. Again, E-Prime randomly selected the order of presentation for the names. For 
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approximately half of the participants, the "E" key (N= 43) was used to classify Insect 
stimuli and "I" for Flower stimuli; and for the rest of the participants (N= 47) "E" was 
used to classify Flower stimuli and "I" for Insect stimuli. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of these category configurations. 
Statistical Power 
The estimated sample size for this study was calculated based on an 
approximation of the effect size (.18) drawn from Study 1 of Dasgupta and Greenwald 
(2001). To reliably detect the effect of the manipulation with .80 power and alpha set at 
.05, the researchers calculated that a minimum sample size of 24 in each group was 
required (Cohen, 1988). The researchers secured many more than the minimum of 48 
participants, and the total sample size of 111 White participants was very satisfactory. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS STUDY TWO 
Data Preparation 
IAT and survey data were prepared following the same procedures described in 
Study 1. No participants had to be excluded from the data due to an overabundance of 
anticipatory responses on the IAT. 
Reliability of Measures 
All three measures demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability. The 
coefficient alphas for the IAT were high for critical trials (a = .83) and practice trials (a = 
.83). The coefficient alpha for the combination of the IAT practice and critical trials (a = 
.88) indicated excellent internal consistency. The coefficient alphas for the M-GUDS-S 
(a = .78) and its subscales were acceptable: Relativistic Appreciation subscale (a = .62); 
Diversity of Contact subscale (a = .76); and Comfort with Differences subscale (a = .65). 
Finally, the coefficient alpha for the SR2K (a = .71) indicated adequate internal 
consistency reliability. 
Differences in Responses across Demographic Groups 
There were significant differences in responses to the three measures by race of 
participant. There were significant mean differences in implicit racial bias across races as 
measured by the IAT, F(5, 190) = 7.13,p < .001, n2 = .18 (See Table 6). White 
participants responded with significantly more implicit racial bias than Black 
participants. There were also differences in the percentage of participants in each racial 
category with implicit bias in their responses (See Table 6). These percentages are on par 
with those reported in previous research. 
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There were significant mean differences in explicit racial bias (SR2K) across 
racial groups, F (5, 190) = 11.43,p < .001, n2 = .30 (See Table 6). White participants 
responded with significantly more explicit racial bias than Black participants. Asian 
participants responded with significantly more implicit racial bias than Black 
participants. There were no significant differences in responses to the M-GUDS-S or its 
subscales across races. 
There were no significant mean differences between males and females on any of 
the measures. There were also no significant interaction effects for the combination of 
race and gender on any of the measures. The Race IAT error rates were on par with those 
reported in previous research (See Table 6). 
Previous research on implicit racial bias has concentrated on the bias of Whites 
against Blacks. The present research is building upon this research and power analyses 
were calculated using effect sizes from previous research. Therefore, the following 
analyses were performed only on the portion of the sample that selected the 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The experimental manipulation of priming with counter stereotypical exemplars 
did not have any direct effect on valuing diversity, explicit racial bias, or implicit racial 
bias (See Table 7). On average, the mean score of the White participants on the M-
GUDS-S was higher in the experimental group but was not significantly different from 
the mean score of the control group, / (109) = -.91, n.s.. The mean score of the White 
participants on the SR2K was lower in the experimental group but was not significantly 
different from the mean score of the control group, t (109) = .89, n.s.. The mean D score 
of the White participants on the IAT was not significantly different from the control 
group, t (109) = -.47, n.s.. This indicates that this study failed to replicate the effect on 
implicit racial bias that was reported in Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001). There were also 
no significant mean differences found between the experimental group, control group, or 
Study 1 sample on any of the measures (See Table 7). 
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Table 7 
Summary Table of Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliabilities by Study and 
Experimental Condition 





























































Note. Summary data shown for White participants only. M-GUDS-S = Miville-Guzman 
Universality-Diversity Scale Short Form; Race IAT = Race Implicit Association Test; 
SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale. 
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Relationship between Measures 
Correlations between the measures were calculated for the two experimental 
conditions (See Table 8). Among the participants in the experimental group, the M-
GUDS-S significantly correlated with the IAT but not the SR2K. The Relativistic 
Appreciation subscale of the M-GUDS-S significantly correlated with the IAT. There 
was no significant correlation between the IAT and the SR2K. When corrected for 
unreliability in the measures using the Spearman correction for attenuation, the 
correlation between valuing diversity and implicit racial bias was estimated at -.36, the 
correlation between valuing diversity and explicit racial bias was estimated at .-34, and 
the correlation between explicit and implicit racial bias was estimated at .05. 
Table 8 
Correlations between the Racial Attitude Measures in Experimental Group 






.04 -- .74 
Note. N= 60. **Significant at/? < .01. *Significant at/? < .05. M-GUDS-S = Miville-
Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale Short Form; M-GUDS RA = M-GUDS Relativistic 
Appreciation subscale; M-GUDS DC = M-GUDS Diversity of Contact; M-GUDS CD = 
M-GUDS Comfort with Differences; SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale; and Race 
IAT = Race Implicit Association Test. 
1. M-GUDS-S 
2. M-GUDS-S RA 
3. M-GUDS-S DC 
4. M-GUDS-S CD 

































The experimental group data replicates the same pattern of relationships 
established in the Study 1 sample, even though the correlation between the SR2K and M-
GUDS-S was not found to be significant (See Table 9). Fisher r-to-z transformation 
revealed that the magnitude of the relationship between the M-GUDS-S and the IAT in 
this sample was not statistically different from the relationship observed in the Study 1 
sample, z = 0,p < .05. Similarly, the magnitude of the relationship between the M-
GUDS-S and the SR2K in this sample was not statistically different from the relationship 
in the Study 1 sample, z = -0.97, n.s.. Finally, the relationship between the SR2K and IAT 
in this sample was not statistically different in magnitude from the Study 1 sample, z — 
.44, n.s.. 
For the participants in the control group, the M-GUDS-S did not significantly 
correlate with either the IAT or the SR2K (See Table 10). None of the M-GUDS-S 
subscales significantly correlated with the IAT or the SR2K. There was also no 
significant correlation between the IAT and the SR2K. 
The control group did not replicate the pattern of results from the Study 1 and 
Study 2 experimental group samples. In fact, the magnitudes of the relationships 
observed in the control group sample were statistically different from the magnitudes 
observed in the other two samples. The magnitude of the relationship between the M-
GUDS-S and the IAT in this sample was statistically different from the magnitude of the 
relationship observed in the Study 1 sample, z = -\.15,p< .05, but not the Study 2 
experimental group, z = 1.52, n.s.. Similarly, the magnitude of the relationship between 
the M-GUDS-S and the SR2K in this sample was statistically different from the 
relationship in the Study 1 sample, z = -2.59, p< .01 but not the Study 2 experimental 
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group, z = 1.45, n.s.. Finally, the relationship between the SR2K and IAT in this sample 
was not statistically different in magnitude from either the Study 1 sample, z = 0.83, n.s., 
or the Study 2 experimental group, z = -0.36, n.s.. 
There were also no significant correlations found between the valuing diversity 
measure and either the explicit or implicit racial bias measures when the experimental 
and control group samples were combined (See Table 9). The M-GUDS-S did not 
significantly correlate with either the IAT or the SR2K. None of the M-GUDS-S 
subscales significantly correlated with the IAT or SR2K. There was again no significant 
correlation between the IAT and the SR2K. 
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Table 9 
Inter-Scale Correlations by Study and Experimental Condition 








































Note. Correlations shown for White participants only. * Significant at/? < .05. 
**Significant at/? < .01. M-GUDS-S = Miville-Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale 
Short Form; IAT = Implicit Association Test; SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale. 
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Table 10 
Correlations between the Racial Attitude Measures in Control Group 






-.03 -- .63 
Note. N=5l. *Significant atp < .05. **Significant atp < .01. M-GUDS-S = Miville-
Guzman Universality-Diversity Scale Short Form; M-GUDS RA = M-GUDS Relativistic 
Appreciation subscale; M-GUDS DC = M-GUDS Diversity of Contact; M-GUDS CD = 
M-GUDS Comfort with Differences; SR2K = Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale; and Race 
IAT = Race Implicit Association Test. 
1. M-GUDS-S 
2. M-GUDS-S RA 
3. M-GUDS-S DC 
4. M-GUDS-S CD 
































Summary of Results 
The results of the second study further inform the nature of the relationship 
between the valuing diversity, implicit racial bias, and explicit racial bias measures. The 
experimental treatment was unsuccessful in manipulating responses to any of the 
measures. There was no significant change in valuing diversity, explicit racial bias, or 
implicit racial bias responses as a result of the treatment. 
In the experimental group, there was a significant negative relationship between 
the valuing diversity and implicit racial bias measures and a negative non-significant 
relationship between the valuing diversity and explicit racial bias measures. There was no 
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significant relationship between the explicit racial bias and implicit racial bias measures. 
Correcting the correlations for attenuation accentuated the strong negative relationship 
between valuing diversity and explicit racial bias as well as strengthened the negative 
relationship between valuing diversity and implicit racial bias. The pattern of 
relationships observed in the experimental group was not statistically different from the 
pattern of relationships observed in the study 1 sample. The control group did not show 
the same pattern of relationships observed in the experimental group and study 1 sample. 
There were no significant correlations found among the target measures in the control 
group. The relationships observed in the control group were statistically different from 
those observed in the experimental group and study 1 sample. The following section will 
discuss the meaningfulness of these results. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research was designed to elucidate and refine the fundamental understanding 
of the valuing diversity construct. Valuing diversity was studied by exploring its 
relationship to two measures of racial bias. Two studies investigated the relationship 
between valuing diversity, explicit racial bias, and implicit racial bias and examined how 
a manipulation might affect these constructs. The results of these studies provide 
important information about the construct validity of valuing diversity. 
Evaluation and Discussion of Results 
The results of Study 1 indicated that explicit and implicit racial bias measures 
both predicted valuing diversity and, in fact, accounted for unique variance in the valuing 
diversity measure. This pattern was replicated in the Study 2 experimental group. This 
result reveals that the valuing diversity construct was significantly related to both explicit 
and implicit racial bias in this sample. No significant relationship was found between 
explicit and implicit racial bias in either study. The error rates, reliabilities, and effect 
sizes in these studies were all in line with what has been published in previous attitudinal 
research. In addition, the percentages of participants with implicit racial bias in their 
responses were on par with previous research. 
Valuing diversity has previously been linked to positive attitudes toward 
diversity, ethnocultural empathy, positive racial identity, lack of homophobia and lack of 
dogmatism (Althouse & Dickinson, 2007; Miville et al., 1999). Previous research also 
has demonstrated valuing diversity is significantly distinct from social desirability, job 
satisfaction, leader-member exchange quality, and verbal and quantitative skills 
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(Althouse & Dickinson, 2007; Miville et al., 1999). The present research contributes to 
the construct validity evidence for valuing diversity by confirming that valuing diversity 
is significantly related to explicit racial bias and implicit racial bias. The two bias 
measures predicted unique variance in the valuing diversity measure. Study 1 showed 
there were significant negative relationships between valuing diversity and explicit racial 
bias as well as valuing diversity and implicit racial bias. Together these constructs 
explained 20% of the variance in valuing diversity. After these correlations were 
corrected for attenuation due to unreliability in the measures, the relationships of the bias 
measures with valuing diversity measure were even stronger. 
The pattern of relationships between the valuing diversity measure and the 
implicit and explicit racial bias measures seen in Study 1 was replicated in the Study 2 
experimental group. In fact, the correlations observed in the two samples were not 
significantly different in magnitude. This suggests that the relationship between the three 
constructs observed in Study 1 replicates in a new sample. This same pattern of 
relationships was not replicated in the Study 2 control group. In fact, there were no 
significant correlations among any of the target measures in Study 2. This unexpected 
result suggests that something about the control task may have changed the pattern of 
relationships among the three target measures. Although similar in design to the 
experimental task, the content of the control task may have appeared easier and more 
simple to participants. It is important for participants to feel their responses are 
meaningful. Perhaps the nature of the control stimuli and the ease of the task trivialized 
participant's subsequent responses to the target measures. 
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The priming manipulation attempted in Study 2 was unsuccessful in significantly 
affecting responses to any of the target measures. Although it was unknown how this 
manipulation would affect responses to the explicit racial bias and valuing diversity 
measures, it was expected that the results observed in Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001) 
would be replicated. The counter stereotypical primes should have affected the responses 
of the experimental group and resulted in the experimental group responding with 
significantly less implicit bias in their subsequent responses. The manipulation should 
have caused a significant, lasting decrease in implicit racial bias. In the present study, 
however, there were no observable effects on implicit racial bias, or on the other two 
measures as a result of the manipulation. Our sample was many times larger than the 
sample in the Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) study so any genuine effect should have 
been replicated here. Future research needs to examine whether or not this particular 
manipulation can reliably affect racial attitudes in other samples. 
Previous research has suggested that explicit and implicit racial biases are unique 
but related constructs. Nosek & Smyth (2007) found that a correlated two-factor model 
with explicit and implicit racial bias as the two factors was the best fit for their data. 
Research on the predictive validity of explicit and implicit measures has supported this 
relationship. Implicit and explicit measures enjoy superiority of prediction for different 
criterion variables and domains (Poehlman et al., 2005). The present study reinforces this 
conceptualization of the relationship. The fact that explicit and implicit racial biases 
explain unique variance in the valuing diversity construct and yet are not significantly 
related to one another provides additional evidence for the distinct but related 
conceptualization of this relationship. 
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Consideration of Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Due to the fact that the pattern of results seen in Study 1 and the Study 2 
experimental group was not replicated in the Study 2 control group sample, these findings 
must be interpreted with caution until they can be replicated in other samples. Although 
the correlations were statistically different in magnitude between the control group and 
the Study 1 samples, these studies took place sequentially and not concurrently. 
Therefore, participants were not randomly assigned to participate in one of these two 
studies. As a result, the validity of these differences is in question. 
The second study did not replicate the manipulation effect described in Dasgupta 
and Greenwald (2001). It is possible that their particular method of priming with counter-
stereotypical exemplars does not affect implicit racial bias as their results would suggest. 
It is also possible that their small sample was unusual in some important way. Prior 
research has shown that priming has been an effective strategy for racial attitude 
manipulation. Bodenhausen et al. (1995) found that activating thoughts about specific 
examples of successful Black individuals did result in more favorable evaluations of that 
group. However, future research needs to confirm that implicit attitudes can be 
manipulated in this manner. Specifically, future research should examine whether 
priming with counter-stereotypical exemplars under the guise of a knowledge task can 
successfully affect racial attitudes. 
The manipulation used in Study 2 was a direct duplication of Dasgupta and 
Greenwald's (2001) procedure with the exception that the present study used both female 
and male exemplars. It is unlikely but possible that the incorporation of female exemplars 
may have had an impact on the effectiveness of the manipulation. In future research 
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examining these types of priming manipulations, participants should be randomly 
assigned to all-male and all-female exemplar conditions. Researchers should examine 
whether gender of the exemplars affects responses to the target measures. Future research 
should randomly assign participants to the control task and no task to see if the control 
task does, in fact, manipulate responses to the target measures. Although the 
manipulation was presented as a knowledge test, the task was quite face-valid and it is 
likely that participants deduced the nature of the manipulation. As a result participants 
could have consciously resisted the manipulation. Future research could also examine 
whether subliminally presented primes are more effective than more overt priming 
strategies. Providing participants an opportunity to process the manipulation could 
increase the chances they resist the treatment. 
Finally, the composition of the sample may have contributed to error in this study. 
Undergraduate college students, the most common participants in attitude research, may 
not be the most appropriate audience for investigations of racial bias measures. There are, 
however, conflicting viewpoints regarding this matter. College students often have more 
tolerant worldviews and may be less likely to harbor negative attitudes toward minorities 
(Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995). Therefore, using samples of college students 
may actually underestimate the correspondence between implicit and explicit 
correspondence due to the minimization of outward expressions of social-group biases in 
university cultures (Nosek, 2007). On the other hand, Banaji & Bhasker (2000) posit that 
college students are the theoretically appropriate population to study the relationship 
between implicit and explicit bias precisely because they are likely to consciously hold 
egalitarian beliefs and simultaneously harbor implicit biases. Previous research has 
58 
universally relied on college student participants. Therefore, any error due to the use of 
college student participants could not explain why previous research was not replicated in 
this study. 
The present research confirms that valuing diversity is related to implicit and 
explicit racial bias. Although this research does clarify the concept of valuing diversity, 
there is significant variance in the valuing diversity construct left to explain. Past research 
has shown that valuing diversity is also related to ethnocultural empathy, positive 
attitudes toward diversity, and positive racial identity. Future research should investigate 
how much of the variance in valuing diversity can be explained using a combination of 
the variables known to be related to the construct. Now that the understanding around the 
valuing diversity construct is growing, there is a need to study the relationship of valuing 
diversity, implicit racial bias, and explicit racial bias with actual discriminatory work 
behaviors. It is important to determine what criteria valuing diversity can effectively 
predict. Future research should examine the predictive validity of valuing diversity and 
whether or not interventions designed to foster more positive attitudes toward diversity 
can also predict reductions in discriminatory work behaviors (both subtle and overt 
racism). Similarly, researchers should establish whether implicit and explicit racial bias 
measures provide incremental validity to valuing diversity measures when predicting 
negative behaviors in the workplace. It is possible that a combination of these measures 
may be the best way to effectively evaluate the success of diversity training programs. 
Conclusions 
The significant relationship found between valuing diversity and explicit racial 
bias suggests that valuing diversity measures share many characteristics with explicit 
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attitudinal measures. They are both self-report measures that are easy to administer, cost-
effective, and have considerable face validity. The significant relationship found between 
valuing diversity and implicit racial bias suggests that valuing diversity measures may 
also share characteristics with implicit attitudinal measures. Ranganath, Smith, and 
Nosek (2008) found that certain direct, self-report measures can actually capture 
components of implicit attitudes. Since both explicit and implicit racial bias can reliably 
predict discriminatory behaviors and attitudes, valuing diversity interventions 
concentrating on appreciation of differences may represent a holistic approach to racial 
attitude change. The present studies represent a successful cross-disciplinary research 
venture. Further research should be completed using techniques and measures from social 
cognition to inform the understanding of concepts from other domains. 
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MIVILLE-GUZMAN UNIVERSALITY-DIVERSITY SCALE (SHORT FORM) ITEMS 
Item 
Subscale Number Item Description Scoring 
Relativistic Appreciation 
1 Persons with disabilities can teach me things I could not 
learn elsewhere. 
2 I can best understand someone after I get to know how 
he/she is both similar and different from me. 
3 Knowing how a person differs from me greatly enhances 
our friendship. 
4 In getting to know someone, I like knowing both how 
she/he differs from me and is similar to me. 
5 Knowing about the different experiences of other people 
helps me understand my own problems better. 
Diversity of Contact 
1 I would like to join an organization that emphasizes 
getting to know people from different countries. 
2 I would like to go to dances that feature music from other 
countries. 
3 I often listen to music of other cultures. 
4 I am interested in learning about the many cultures that 
have existed in this world. 
5 I attend events where I might get to know people from 
different racial backgrounds. 
Comfort with Differences 
1 Getting to know someone of another race is generally an R 
uncomfortable experience for me. 
2 I am only at ease with people of my own race. R 
3 It is really hard for me to feel close to a person of another R 
race. 
4 I often feel irritated by persons of a different race. R 
It is very important that a friend agrees with me on most 
5 issues. R 
Note. From Miville et al., 1999. 
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APPENDIX B 
SYMBOLIC RACISM 2000 SCALE ITEMS 
Item 
Number Item Description Answer Options 
1 It's really a matter of some people not 
trying hard enough; if Blacks would 
only try harder they could be just as well 
off as whites. (R) 
Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other 
minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do 
the same. (R) 
Some say that Black leaders have been 
trying to push too fast. Others feel that 
they haven't pushed fast enough. What 
do you think? 
How much of the racial tension that 
exists in the United States today do you 










Trying to push much too fast 
Going too slowly 
Moving at about the right 
speed 
All of it 
Most 
Some 
Not much at all 
How much discrimination against A lot 
Blacks do you feel there is in the United Some 
States today, limiting their chances to Just a little 
get ahead? None at all 
Generations of slavery and 
discrimination have created conditions 
that make it difficult for Blacks to work 
their way out of the lower class. 
Over the past few years, Blacks have 
gotten less than they deserve. 
Over the past few years, Blacks have 














Note. From Henry & Sears, 2002. 
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APPENDIX C 















Note. From Nosek et al., 2002 
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APPENDIX D 
IAT EXAMPLE SCREENSHOTS 
Screenshot from Race IAT Block 1: Words Only (Practice, 24 trials): 
Screenshot from Race IAT Block 2: Faces Only (Practice, 24 trials): 
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Screenshots from Race IAT Blocks 3 and 4: Words and Faces #1 (Practice, 24 trials; 
Critical, 48 trials): 




Screenshots from Race IAT Blocks 5 and 6: Words and Faces #2 (Practice, 24 trials; 
Critical, 48 trials): 
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PROJECT IMPLICIT 
Description: This is an (approximately) one-hour computer-based onsite 
study that measures social attitudes along with performance in 
sorting and knowledge tasks. 
Participants: This study is open to all students in the Psychology 
Participant Pool ages 18 and up. 
Time Requirements: This study should take approximately one-hour to complete. 
Sign-up Information: To find and sign up for open sessions visit the Psychology 
Department on-line participant sign-up system at 
http://odupsychology.sona-systems.com/ 
Research Participation Credits: 
Additional Information: 
Researcher and Contact Information: 
You will receive one (1) Participation Experience 
Credit (PEC) for your participation. 
Faculty Supervisor: Ivan Ash, Ph.D., Assistant Professor 
Department of Psychology, ODU 






Informed Consent to Participate in Research 
Old Dominion University 
College of Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
Introduction: The purposes of this form are to give you information that may affect your 
decision whether to say YES or NO to participation in Project Implicit, and to record the 
consent of those who say YES. 
Principal Investigator: 
Ivan Ash, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor 
College of Sciences 
Department of Psychology 
Old Dominion University 
e-mail: iash@odu.edu 
phone: 757.683.4446 
Description of Research: This experiment investigates social attitudes and measures 
performance on sorting procedures. All responses are anonymous. Should you decide to 
participate you will respond to a number of questions and complete a series of tasks using a 
computer. The tasks will require you to sort words and photos into different categories. 
Afterwards you will be debriefed by the researchers and before leaving you will have an 
opportunity to ask any questions you may have about this experiment. If you say YES, then 
your participation will last for approximately 1 hour. 
Exclusionary Criteria: You must be at least 18 years of age. 
Risks and Benefits: RISKS: There are no substantial risks for participants in this study. 
However, as with any research, there is always the possibility that you may be subject to 
risks that have not yet been identified. If at any point during the course of the experiment you 
feel uncomfortable, remember that your participation is voluntary and you may end your 
participation at any time without penalty. BENEFITS: If you decide to participate in this 
study, you will receive 1 Psychology Department research credit, which may be applied to 
course requirements or extra credit in certain Psychology courses. Equivalent credits may be 
obtained in other ways. You do not have to participate in this study, or any Psychology 
Department study, in order to obtain this credit 
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Costs and Payments: All participants will receive 1 Psychology Department Research 
Credit for participation in this study. 
Confidentiality: All information obtained about you in this study is strictly confidential 
unless disclosure is required by law. The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations and publications. All results will be reported in the aggregate, and the 
researcher will not identify you. Although your name and email were used to make your 
appointment and will be used to assign research credit, you will be assigned a participant 
number which cannot be connected to this information. This number will be used to organize 
all your responses. Therefore, your identity can never be associated with your questionnaire 
responses or performance data. Your responses will be completely anonymous, in accordance 
and observation with ethical guidelines established by the American Psychological 
Association (A.P.A.). 
Withdrawal Privilege: It is OK for you to say NO. Even if you say YES now, you are free 
to say NO later, and walk away or withdraw from the study at any time. Your decision will 
not affect your relationship with Old Dominion University, or otherwise cause a loss of 
benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled. Also, the investigators reserve the right to 
withdraw your participation at any time throughout this investigation. 
Compensation for Illness and Injury: If you say YES, then your consent in this document 
does not waive any of your legal rights. It is highly improbable and unlikely that any illness 
or injury will result from your participation with this research project. However, in the event 
of any harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are 
able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other 
compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer harm as a result of participation in 
this research project, you may contact Dr. Ivan Ash at 757.683.4446 or Dr. George Maihafer, 
the current IRB chair at 757.683.4520 at Old Dominion University, who will be glad to 
review the matter with you. 
Voluntary Consent: By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying 
that you have read this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you 
understand this form, the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers 
should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have 
any questions later on, please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Ivan Ash, at 
757.683.4446. 
If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your 
rights or this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 
757.683.4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 757.683.3460. 
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And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to 
participate in this study. The researcher should give you a copy of this form for your 
records. 
I agree to participate in Project Implicit 
Participant's Printed Name Participant's Signature Date 
Investigator's Statement: I certify that I have explained to this participant the nature and 
purpose of this research, including benefits, risks, costs, and any experimental procedures. I 
have described the rights and protections afforded to human subjects and have done nothing 
to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this subject into participating. I am aware of my 
obligations under state and federal laws, and promise compliance. I have answered the 
participant's questions and have encouraged him/her to ask additional questions at any time 
during the course of this study. I have witnessed the above signature on this consent form. 




Good Morning/Good Afternoon/Good Evening. 
My name is , and on behalf of Old Dominion University I would 
like to thank you for participating in Project Implicit. 
The first thing we need to go over is the informed consent form in front of you. Please 
sign it only after you have read it in full, and please let me know if you have any 
questions. 
Do you have any questions about this form? 
You should know that your participation in Project Implicit is strictly voluntary. If for 
any reason you become uncomfortable during participation you may let me know and 
you will be free to stop participating without penalty. 
This experiment will take approximately one hour. You will respond to a series of tasks and 
answer questions on the computer. Your name and UIN will not be linked to your responses 
in any way. All your responses are completely anonymous. It is very important that you read 
ALL instructions on your computer screen before proceeding with each task. It is also very 
important that when you finish the experiment you wait quietly in your seats until the rest of 
the group finishes. Please be patient because any noise or disruption could contaminate the 
data we are recording. There is no reward for finishing early. After EVERYONE finishes we 
will have an opportunity to talk about the experiment before you leave. At that time you will 
have an opportunity to ask any questions that you may have about this experiment. I will then 
sign your receipts and dismiss you. 
It's very important that you are at least 18 years old. There is of course no penalty for this 
and you will receive research credit in compensation for keeping this appointment. Again if 
you become uncomfortable at any time during this experiment and do not feel like 
continuing, please let me know. If you have any other questions, please let me know before 
we begin... 
Please watch the screen, carefully read all the directions, and respond at your own pace... 





Number Question Answer Options 
1 What is your age? 
2 What is your gender? 
Which racial category do you 






Native American/Alaska Native 
Asian/Pacific Islander 
Other 
Please indicate your current 
citizenship status 
Please indicate your marital status 
U.S. Citizen 








Measure Instructions Text 
Implicit Association Test Words or images that represent the categories at the top of 
the screen will appear one at a time in the middle of the 
screen. Your task is to classify these words and images. 
When an item appears that belongs in the category on the 
left, press the "e" key; when an item appears that belongs in 
the category on the right, press the "i" key. Items can only 
belong to one category. If you make an error you will see a 
red "X". Please press the correct key and the experiment 
will continue. This is a timed test, GO AS FAST AS YOU 
CAN while making as few mistakes as possible. Accuracy 
and speed are both important. Pay close attention to the 
category labels at the top of the screen. They will change 
from block to block. Please direct any questions to the 
experimenter. When you are ready to continue please place 
your middle fingers on the "e" and "i" keys of your 
keyboard and press the SPACEBAR to begin. 
The following survey measures your opinions. Items have 
no right or wrong answers. Please rate how strongly you 
agree or disagree with each of the following statements by 
pressing the appropriate number on the keyboard. 
Please read each item carefully and respond at your own 
pace. Once you respond to an item you cannot change your 
answer. When you are ready to continue please press the 
SPACEBAR to begin. 
Symbolic Racism 2000 The following survey measures your opinions. Items have 
Scale no right or wrong answers. Please choose a response to the 
following statements by pressing the appropriate number on 
the keyboard. Please read each item carefully and respond 
at your own pace. Once you respond to an item you cannot 
go back and change your answer. When you are ready to 
continue please press the SPACEBAR to begin. 
Miville-Guzman 
Universality-Diversity 




Dr. Ash and his research team would like to thank you for participating in this study. We 
appreciate your diligence and patience. 
The experiments you participate in as part of the Psychology Experience Credit program 
are meant to serve as educational opportunities, which allow you to learn a little about 
how psychologists study the nature of behavior, beliefs, emotions, and cognition. Please 
read the following debriefing that will explain the purpose of the study in which you 
participated. 
The sorting procedure that you participated in is called an Implicit Association Test, or 
IAT. The IAT procedure is used to measure the nature of people's mental representations 
of different concepts. Often people are not fully aware of some of the underlying mental 
associations they make. This is because the process by which we form and access these 
associations may largely be involuntary or "implicit". The test you participated in sought 
to measure your implicit racial bias. The test works by measuring differences in reaction 
time for categorization tasks. The basic idea is that if participants were to respond faster 
when White faces and good words are classified with the same response key than when 
Black faces and good words are classified with the same response key, this implies an 
unconscious or automatic racial prejudice. 
The surveys you were asked to complete measured explicit racial bias as well as attitudes 
related to valuing diversity. We hope to use the data collected in this study to investigate 
the relationship between explicit and implicit racial attitudes, as well as attitudes related 
to valuing diversity. 
Some of you may have been asked to complete a knowledge task prior to completing the 
IAT procedure. This task was designed to prime participants using counter-stereotypical 
exemplars. The data from participants who completed this task will be compared to a 
control group in order to investigate how attitudes related to racial bias may be 
manipulated using priming. 
We assure you that your scores on the IAT and all other measures you completed cannot 
be linked to your identifying information in any way. Your responses will be stored 
anonymously. There is no way for you to obtain information related to your personal 
performance on any of the measures. All reports, presentations and publications of the 
results of this study will report data analyzed at the group level. No individual responses 
will be reported. 
As you can see from the nature of the IAT test, it is very important that participants are 
unaware about what we are trying to measure while they are completing the study. 
Therefore, we ask you not to discuss the experiment with anyone in the university 
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participant pool. We ask that you continue to refrain from discussing this study with 
anyone who may be in your psychology classes this semester. This will help ensure that 
the data we collect in this study are uncontaminated and that everyone's time spent 
participating in this experiment was worthwhile. 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, or just want to learn more about 
the IAT test, feel free to contact the principal investigator Ivan K. Ash, Ph.D. Assistant 
Professor of Psychology at iashfajodu.edu or 757.683.4446. 
Thank you again for your participation. 
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APPENDIX K 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK EXEMPLARS 
Name True Description False Description 
Admired Black Exemplars 
Martin Luther Leader of the Black Civil Former Vice President of the 






Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs U.S. Ambassador to the United 
of Staff for the U.S. Nations. 
Department of Defense. 
Famous actor who played a 
leading role in the movie The 
Manchurian Candidate. 
One of the world's best 
basketball players. 
Famous American tennis player. 
Lead singer of a popular rock 
band. 
Tiger Woods Professional golf champion. Famous country music star. 
Nelson Former president of South 
Mandela Africa. 
Famous TV talk show host. 
Condoleezza Secretary of State under 
Rice President George W. Bush. 
Maya 
Angelou 
CEO of major financial services 
corporation. 
Oprah Emmy award-winning TV talk Inventor of the digital camera. 
Winfrey show host. 
Famous American author. 
Halle Berry Oscar-winning actress. 
Former Senator from Mississippi. 
News anchor for NBC. 
Disliked White Exemplars 
Al Capone Famous American gangster Leader of an antigovernment 
who terrorized Chicago in the militia in the 1930s. 
1920s. 
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Name True Description False Description 
Timothy Bombed the federal building in Member of the mafia, arrested for 
McVeigh Oklahoma City. drug trafficking. 
Charles 
Manson 
Serial killer who operated in Embezzled millions of dollars of 
Los Angeles in the late 1960s. taxpayer's money in the 1980s. 
Scott Peterson Convicted of murdering his 
pregnant wife. 
Member of an international 
terrorist association. 







Responsible for the genocide 
of millions during WWII. 
Put on trial for poisoning 
schoolchildren. 
Convicted of statutory rape for Responsible for the crash of TWA 
having a sexual relationship Flight 800. 
with an underage student. 
Convicted serial killer and 
prostitute. 
Convicted for a series of bank 
robberies. 
Andrea Yates Killed her five young children Attempted to assassinate President 
in 2001. Ronald Reagan. 
Susan Smith Sentenced to life in prison for Famous arsonist. 
murdering her two sons. 
Note. Based on experimental exemplars in Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001. 
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Note. Based on control exemplars in Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001. 
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APPENDIX M 
EXPERIMENTAL TASK SCREENSHOTS 
Screenshots from Experimental Priming Task: Block 1 (40 trials) and Block 2 (40 trials): 
Leader of the Black Civil Rights 
movement in the 1960s. 
Former Vice President of the 
United States. 
Martin Luther King 
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APPENDIX N 
EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
Measure Instructions Text 
Control Task 
Block One The following is a general knowledge test designed to assess your 
familiarity with insect and flower types. Photographs of insects and 
flowers will appear one at a time in the middle of the screen. There 
will be two names at the top of the screen; one correct and one 
incorrect. Your task is to identify the correct name. If you believe 
the name on the left is correct, press the "e" key; if you believe the 
name on the right is correct, press the "i" key. If you make an error 
you will see a red "X". Please select the correct description and the 
experiment will continue. Please direct any questions to the 
experimenter. When you are ready to continue please place your 
middle fingers on the "e" and "i" keys of your keyboard and press 
the SPACEBAR to begin. 
Block Two In the following section, your task is to identify the correct category 
for the name that appears in the center of the screen. If you believe 
the category on the left is correct, press the "e" key; if you believe 
the category on the right is correct, press the "i" key. If you make 
an error you will see a red "X". Please select the correct category 
and the experiment will continue. Please direct any questions to the 
experimenter. When you are ready to continue please place your 
middle fingers on the "e" and "i" keys of your keyboard and press 
the SPACEBAR to begin. 
Experimental Task 
Block One The following is a general knowledge test designed to assess 
your familiarity with famous and infamous individuals. 
Photographs of individuals will appear one at a time in the 
middle of the screen. There will be two descriptions of the 
individuals at the top of the screen; one correct and one 
incorrect. Your task is to identify the correct description. If you 
believe the description on the left is correct, press the "e" key; if 
you believe the description on the right is correct, press the "i" 
key. If you make an error you will see a red "X". Please select 
the correct description and the experiment will continue. Please 
direct any questions to the experimenter. When you are ready to 
continue please place your middle fingers on the "e" and "i" keys 
of your keyboard and press the SPACEBAR to begin. 
Measure Instructions Text 
Experimental Task (cont.) 
Block Two In the following section, your task is to identify the correct 
racial category for the name that appears in the center of the 
screen. If you believe the category on the left is correct, press 
the "e" key; if you believe the category on the right is correct, 
press the "i" key. If you make an error you will see a red "X". 
Please select the correct category and the experiment will 
continue. Please direct any questions to the experimenter. 
When you are ready to continue please place your middle 
fingers on the "e" and "i" keys of your keyboard and press the 
SPACEBAR to begin. 
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APPENDIX O 
CONTROL TASK SCREENSHOTS 
Screenshots from Control Task: Block 1 (40 trials) and Block 2 (40 trials): 
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